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ABSTRACT 
Data wire cable runs are a significant presence on the exterior of the International 
Space Station (ISS), and continued ISS mission support requires detailed assessment of 
cables due to micrometeoroid and orbit debris (MMOD) impact. These data wire cables 
are twisted-pair cables consisting of two 22AWG stranded conductors and fillers inside 
a tight fitting braided copper shield. The copper shield and its contents are covered with 
a jacket that has a nominal outer diameter of 3.76mm and beta-cloth tape. The ISS 
engineering community has identified two loss-of-function mechanisms for these 
cables: open circuits due to severed conductors within the cable, and short circuits due 
to contact between conductors or grounded components. As these data cables are low 
power systems, short circuits are not expected to burn away the contact, so both open 
and short circuits are considered permanent loss-of-function for the cable. A total of 
ninety-seven impact experiments have been performed into these cables to develop a 
statistical model for the failure of these cables to be used in reliability studies. The 
experimental work has yielded cumulative distribution functions for these cables for 
steel and aluminum components of the orbital debris environment at representative 
speeds and impact obliquities.  
NOMENCLATURE 
 
d  diameter (mm) d�  mean diameter (mm) 
δd  diameter scale length (mm) 
C  failure count 
P  probability 
S  survivor count 
 
Subscripts 
F  failure 
i  impact 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The ISS Command and Data Handling (C&DH) system utilizes the MIL-STD-1553 
data bus system [1,2] to interconnect its various subsystems such as the Multiplexer De-
Multiplexers (MDMs) [3]. The 1553 data bus system is composed of shielded, twisted-
pair cables and is doubly redundant. There are 45 MDMs on the ISS with 21 of these 
MDMs external to the habitable volume. The data buses that service these systems are 
exposed to the micrometeoroid-orbital debris (MMOD) environment especially in the 
case of open ISS structures such as the P3 or S3 truss segments like that shown in Fig. 
1. 
A previous test conducted in 1995 (Test #A2372) resulted in a shorted conductor 
[4] under an impact from a 0.4mm Al 2017-T4 projectile travelling approximately 
7km/s, and has since dominated reliability calculations for the system [5]. Since this 
early design phase, limited additional research has focused on this cable with heavier 
shielding [6], and none in the flight-like configuration for the ISS. One purpose of this 
study is to address the limitations of these early works for the flight-like configuration 
and to quantify how cable internal geometry affects the critical particle size. In addition, 
the study has sought to understand if there is a difference in damage to the cable if it is 
backed by a structural element as compared to an end supported configuration. As can 
be seen in Fig. 1, both of these configurations are present in a typical cable run through 
a truss on the ISS. In addition to these objectives, this study also included high density 
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particle threats, like steel, in addition to aluminum, and oblique impacts relative to the 
length of the cable. 
 
As a result of the multiple objectives and the need to develop cumulative statistic 
models, this study considered ninety-seven impact experiments performed by the 
NASA White Sands Test Facility’s Remote Hypervelocity Test Laboratory. 
Coordination between the ISS program and the hypervelocity impact laboratory and 
target characterization has been performed by NASA Johnson Space Center’s 
Hypervelocity Impact Technology group. This paper presents the findings of this study, 
along with empirical models that summarize the collected data for the use in reliability 
assessments of the ISS and other orbital architectures that use similar hardware. 
 
 
Figure 1. An ISS truss with exposed C&DH and power cables as imaged during an Expedition 48 
extravehicular activity (EVA) of Commander Jeff Williams and Flight Engineer Kate Rubins [7]. 
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METHODS 
The MIL-STD-1553 data cables on ISS structures are both directly supported by 
structural elements and unsupported runs between them; therefore, both supporting 
schemes have been considered [8]. This effort used wo types of experimental articles to 
reflect each scheme with characteristic examples shown in Fig. 2. The cables that are in 
the experimental articles have come from decommissioned MIL-STD-1553 flight 
cables provided by the ISS program office’s prime contractor, the Boeing Company. 
The supported configuration, shown in Fig. 2a, consists of cables placed side by side 
over a 3.175mm aluminum hardback, which is schematically rendered as a cross-section 
in Fig. 2b. The unsupported configuration, shown in Fig. 2c, consists of cables held in 
place by a frame separated from a 1mm aluminum witness plate by at least 50mm, which 
is schematically rendered as a cross-section in Fig. 2d. Cable runs have been doubled or 
tripled to improve the probability of an impact as there is a small impact aim point 
uncertainty associated with the aerodynamic effects from the experiments.  
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A reconstructed, CT-radiograph of a cross-section of an actual experimental 
specimen is shown in Fig. 3 with the major components of the cable called out. The 
radiograph has been obtained using North Star Imaging software and a NASA Johnson 
Space Center custom system that uses a Hamamatsu 150kV Microfocus L8121-03 
source with a PerkinElmer XRD 1621detector.  
The 1553 data bus twisted-pair cable, consists of two 22 AWG stranded conductors 
with nominal diameters of 0.76mm, covered with polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) 
a) b) 
 
 
c) d) 
 
 
  
Figure 2. The ISS C&DH cable configurations with hard-backing a) viewed from the front with a  
b) cross-section schematic and suspended c) viewed from the front with a d) cross-section 
schematic. Cross-section schematics are not to scale. 
 
 
Cable Array 
 
 
 
 
 
3.125mm 
Al2024 Plate 
 
50mm 
Cable Array 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0mm  
Al2024 Plate 
7 
 
insulation such that the nominal diameter of the finished basic wire is 1.32mm. The 
wires are twisted, along with two 0.889mm diameter fillers inside a tight fitting braided 
copper shield (through-thickness areal density of 0.034g/cm2) and covered with a 
fluorinated ethylene propylene (FEP) jacket having a nominal outer diameter of 
3.76mm.  
 
To match the on-orbit configuration the wire has been wrapped with 25.4mm wide 
strips of beta-cloth tape (areal density 0.029g/cm2) using a 50% overwrap. The 50% 
overwrap means that the cable has two layers of beta-cloth over its length; although, in 
the actual experimental article setup, the coverage is sometimes slightly higher. The 
50% overwrap specification requires that each twist overlap the previous layer by 
12.7mm perpendicular to the length of the wrap strip.  
 
RESULTS 
Typical results of four experiments that resulted in a short of the twisted-pair data 
cables are given in Fig. 4 for normal to the cable and 45° to normal to the cable. The 
impact obliquity is relative to the plane that contains the length of the cable and the 
 
Figure 3. Cross-section image of the ISS C&DH twisted-pair cable from a CT scan of an 
experimental article. 
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cross-product of the projectile impact vector and the cable axis (vertical in Fig. 2a and 
2c). This study has considered both spherical aluminum and steel projectiles at impact 
speeds of 7.0±0.3km/s [8].  
Figure 4 includes an optical micrograph and the corresponding CT-radiograph of 
HITF15035 in Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b, respectively. As can be seen in Fig. 4a, much of the 
shielding has been exposed by the impact event, and that the shielding came into contact 
with one of the conductors resulting in a short as seen in Fig. 4b. This condition resulted 
from an impact of a 0.6 mm Al2017 spherical projectile at 7.25km/s. What can also be 
seen from this pair of images is that the final condition of the internal, cable-components 
is only easily seen from the CT-radiograph, so only when CT-radiographs are obtained 
are impact locations known with certainty. CT-radiographs have not been obtained for 
all ninety-seven experiments due to the volume of work and the complexity of CT-
radiography; however, optical microscopy with continuity and short-circuit 
measurements are sufficient for determining loss-of-function. 
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During the full course of this study, both types of failure modes (shorts and open 
circuits) have been observed in the hypervelocity experiments; however, the smallest 
particles that result in permanent, loss-of-function of the cable generally result from 
short circuits before open circuits. Other representative short circuits from additional 
aluminum and steel impacts are shown in Fig. 4c through Fig. 4e.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Due to the non-uniformity of internal materials, a pronounced variability for the 
outcome has occurred with the same particle size resulting in both closed and short 
circuits depending on the impact conditions. To illustrate this, the count of particles that 
resulted in an intact cable for a given particle size bin is shown in Fig. 5 as an orange 
a) b) 
  
c) d) e) 
   
Figure 4. Typical impact results at 7 km/s for ISS C&DH cables including a) an optical micrograph 
from HITF15035 (a 0.6 mm Al2017 projectile) and b) a CT cross-sectional image of HITF15035. 
Additional CT cross-sectional images of c) HITF15040 (a 0.6 mm Al projectile), d) HITF15043 (a 
0.44 mm SS440C projectile), and e) HITF150447 (a 0.44 mm SS440C projectile). 
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bar for each impact condition. Similarly, the count of particles that resulted in a failure, 
short or open conductor, for a given particle bin are shown as a stacked blue bar. The 
combined height of the two bars is the total number of impacts considered for a given 
impact condition, and this total count includes all of the experiments performed under 
this study as well as the experiments documented in Ref. 4. As can be seen, the count 
of intact results generally decreases with impact particle size, and the count of failed 
results generally increases with impact particle size.  
 
A total of twenty-five impact experiments using a 0.6 mm Al2017 at 7 km/s normal 
to the cable have been performed to understand the influence of the mounting system. 
Of these twenty-five impact experiments, nine of the experiments have been performed 
in a supported, hard-backed, configuration, and sixteen have been performed in an 
unsupported, suspended, configuration. Of the nine supported experiments, only one of 
the experiments resulted in a failed cable; whereas, of the sixteen unsupported 
a) b) 
  
c) d) 
  
Figure 5. The ISS C&DH cable statistical analysis for 7 km/s impacts of spherical Al2017 a) at 
normal incidence and b) 45° to normal, and spherical SS440C c) at normal and d) 45° to normal. 
The plots show the cumulative count and probability of failure as a function of projectile diameter. 
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experiments, five of the experiments resulted in a failed cable. As such, the probability 
of failing the cable is approximately three times higher for the unsupported cable as 
compared to the supported cable; although, implicit in this observation is the assumption 
that neither configuration experienced biased impact conditions (i.e. variance in impact 
speed and location is random over the set of experiments).  
For the fifteen impact experiments using a 0.44 mm SS440C at 7 km/s normal to 
the cable, five supported experiments resulted in three failed cables. This failure rate is 
similar to the ten unsupported experiments with seven failed cables. As the mounting 
observations of steel didn’t reverse the findings with aluminum, subsequent 
experiments focused on the unsupported cable configuration; however, the mounting 
architecture continued to be explored at lower resolution for other impact conditions. 
As the motivation of this work has been to not only identify configuration 
dependence but to also develop probabilistic models for use in assessments, a model for 
the functional dependence of probability of failure based on particle size, material and 
obliquity has been developed. To this end, the cumulative failure count to a given 
particle diameter has been divided by the total cumulative survival count of experiments 
to arrive at a failure probability given by, 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶+𝑆𝑆,  
 
where C and S are the cumulative count of failures from smallest particle bin to the 
largest and survivors from largest particle bin to the smallest, respectively. As the 
cumulative count of failure goes to zero for small particle diameters, this failure 
probability goes to zero for small particles. Similarly, the cumulative count of survivors 
goes to zero for large particle diameters; hence, the failure probability goes to unity for 
large particles.  
(1) 
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This failure probability is also shown in Fig. 5 as the data points, and they 
correspond to the secondary ordinate. To model this failure probability, a nonlinear 
regression to a logistic function with the independent variable of diameter, 𝑑𝑑, has been 
performed. The failure probability, 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹, is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹[𝑑𝑑] = 1
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�− �𝑑𝑑−𝑑𝑑�
𝛿𝛿𝑑𝑑
��+1
.  
 
The two fitting parameters are the diameter at 50% probability of failure, ?̅?𝑑, and a 
diameter scale length, 𝛿𝛿𝑑𝑑. The values for these coefficients for the two projectile 
materials and the two impact obliquities considered are given in Table I. The mean 
standard error for the coefficients based on the quality of fit is included with the best fit 
parameters. This model is also shown on Fig. 5 with the best fit curve and associated 
uncertainty estimates. As this model is a fit, it approaches the two limits of probability 
for small and large particles and never fully reaches them. 
 
TABLE I. STATISTICAL MODEL COEFFICIENTS 
Material 
 
𝛉𝛉𝐢𝐢 
(°) 
𝐝𝐝 ̅
(mm) 
𝛅𝛅𝐝𝐝 
(mm) 
Al2017 0 0.6494±0.0037 0.0546±0.0032 
Al2017 45 1.067±0.017 0.135±0.015 
SS440C 0 0.377±0.013 0.047±0.021 
SS440C 45 0.652±0.010 0.0720±0.0088 
 
As the normal aluminum impact experiments had a large data set, the uncertainty 
associated with the parameters are low; conversely, the smaller data set for the oblique 
aluminum impact experiments resulted in a larger model spread. Owing to the limits of 
the dataset, the normal impact steel and oblique aluminum models are extrapolated 
outside of the dataset, which results in additional systematic uncertainty.  
(2) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The ISS C&DH cable runs are a significant presence on the exterior of the 
International Space Station (ISS), and as such, these components are affected by the 
external environments including MMOD. Moreover, as the cables are of a universal 
architecture, they have a broader presence in many other satellites and vehicles and are 
of a more general interest for other MMOD analyses. For these reasons, these 1553 
cables have been studied in detail and summarized herein.  
This work revisited some of the early reliability engineering assessments for the ISS 
C&DH cable runs. To this end, a total of ninety-seven impact experiments have been 
performed to develop a statistical model for future analysis of this component. Using 
the data that has been obtained thus far for the ISS program, this work has yielded 
cumulative distribution functions for these cables for steel and aluminum components 
of the orbital debris environment at a representative impact speed and obliquities for 
ISS operation. It has been found that while during the design phase a failure due to 
shorting occurred for a 0.4mm particle, a much more exhaustive look shows that more 
than a 50% larger particle is needed to achieve a 50% failure probability. This 
demonstrates that it is likely that the cables are more robust than was initially assumed 
during the vehicle design [5]. Additionally, it has been considered and found that an 
unsupported cable has a higher probability of failing than a supported cable, and as such, 
the majority of the obtained data from this study used that configuration. While the 
scope of the experimental work is significant and touched many areas of concern for the 
cable’s continued operation, some impact conditions have been left unexplored. Most 
notable among the dataset insufficiencies is the lack of observations to check the impact 
speed dependence on the performance of the cable.   
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In spite of the large set of impact experiments, the breadth of variability in a cable 
and the many factors in the MMOD environment definition leaves room for further 
exploration. Among the possibilities are impact speed variation and extending impact 
obliquity assessments. Additionally, as it is likely that other impacting materials and 
shapes are needed for full reliability assessments, these parameters have received 
limited variation here and may need to be explored in more depth. 
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